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Abstract—The rise of deep learning technique has raised
new privacy concerns about the training data and test data.
In this work, we investigate the model inversion problem in
the adversarial settings, where the adversary aims at inferring
information about the target model’s training data and test
data from the model’s prediction values. We develop a solution
to train a second neural network that acts as the inverse
of the target model to perform the inversion. The inversion
model can be trained with black-box accesses to the target
model. We propose two main techniques towards training the
inversion model in the adversarial settings. First, we leverage
the adversary’s background knowledge to compose an auxiliary
set to train the inversion model, which does not require access
to the original training data. Second, we design a truncation-
based technique to align the inversion model to enable effective
inversion of the target model from partial predictions that
the adversary obtains on victim user’s data. We systematically
evaluate our inversion approach in various machine learning
tasks and model architectures on multiple image datasets. Our
experimental results show that even with no full knowledge
about the target model’s training data, and with only partial
prediction values, our inversion approach is still able to perform
accurate inversion of the target model, and outperform previous
approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models, especially deep neural
networks, are becoming ubiquitous, powering an extremely
wide variety of applications. The mass adoption of machine
learning technology has increased the capacity of software
systems in large amounts of complex data, enabling a wide
range of applications. For example, facial recognition APIs,
such as Apple’s face-tracking APIs in the ARKit [1], provide
scores of facial attributes, including emotion and eye-openness
levels. There are also online services that evaluate users’ face
beauty and age [2], [3], [4]. Users often share their face-
beauty scores on social media for fun. The prediction scores
are definitely linked to the input face data, but it is not apparent
to what level of accuracy the original data can be recovered.
Privacy concerns arise in such applications.
There have been many research efforts in model inversion,
which aims to obtain information about the training data
from the model’s predictions. They are largely divided into
two classes of approaches. The first class inverts a model
by making use of gradient-based optimization in the data
space [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. We call this class of
approach optimization-based approach. For example, model
inversion attack (MIA) [5] was proposed to infer training
classes against neural networks by generating a representative
sample for the target class. It casts the inversion task as
an optimization problem to find the “optimal” data for a
given class. MIA works for simple networks but is shown
to be ineffective against complex neural networks such as
convolutional neural network (CNN) [12], [13], [14]. Our
experiment also obtains similar result as shown in Figure 1
column (f). This is mainly because the optimization objective
of optimization-based approach does not really capture the
semantics of the data space (see Section II-B). The second
class of approach [15], [16], [17], [18] invert a model by
learning a second model that acts as the inverse of the original
one. We call this class of approach training-based approach.
They target at reconstructing images from their computer
vision features including activations in each layer of a neural
network. Therefore, to maximally reconstruct the images, they
train the second model using full prediction vectors on the
same training data of the classifier.
In this work, we focus on the adversarial scenario, where an
adversary is given the classifier and the prediction result, and
aims to make sense of the input data and/or the semantics of
the classification. Such problem is also known as the inversion
attack [5], [19] wherein information about the input data
could be inferred from its prediction values. There are two
adversarial inversion settings, namely data reconstruction and
training class inference.
Data reconstruction: In this attack, the adversary is asked
to reconstruct unknown data given the classifier’s prediction
vector on it, which is exactly the inversion of the classifier.
For example, in a facial recognition classifier that outputs the
person’s identity in a facial image, the attacker’s goal is to
reconstruct the facial image of a person.
Training class inference: This kind of attack aims at recov-
ering a semantically meaningful data for each training class of
a trained classifier. In the above-mentioned facial recognition
example, the attack goal is to recover a recognizable facial
image of an arbitrary person (class) in the training data. This
attack can be achieved by inverting the classifier to generate
a representative sample which is classified as the wanted
class [5].
However, inversion in adversarial settings is different from
existing model inversion settings. Specifically, in adversarial
settings, the attacker has no knowledge about the classifier’s
training data. Thus, previously known training-based meth-
ods that use the same training data to train the “inversion”
model cannot be directly applied. Existing optimization-based
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Fig. 1: Training data reconstruction and training class infer-
ence of our and previous approaches against a facial recogni-
tion classifier. Column (a) and (b) compare our approach with
a known training-based (TB) method when only 1/5 prediction
results are available. Column (c) shows our result of inverting
full prediction vectors by training the inversion model on
auxiliary samples. Column (e)-(g) compare our approach with
MIA and the known prior TB method. Note that we use
auxiliary samples for our approach in all experiments.
approaches require white-box accesses to the classifier to
compute the gradients, and therefore they cannot work if
the classifier is a blackbox. More importantly, the adversary
might obtain only partial prediction results on victim data. For
example, the ImageNet dataset [20] has over 20,000 classes.
Since the majority values in the prediction vector are small,
it is more practical to release only the top 5 to 10 predicted
classes [21]. Victim users might also post partial predicted
scores to the social media. The partial predictions largely
limit the reconstruction ability of the inversion model. For
example, Figure 1 column (a) shows the result of inverting
a “truncated” prediction vector (i.e., keeping the 1/5 largest
values while masking the rest to 0). The poor result is probably
due to overfitting in the inversion model. Hence, although
reconstruction is accurate on the full prediction vector, a slight
deviation such as truncation in the prediction vector will lead
to a dramatically different result.
In this paper, we formulate the adversarial settings, and
propose an effective approach to invert neural networks in
such settings. We adopt the above-mentioned training-based
approach. That is, a second neural network (referred to as
inversion model) is trained to perform the inversion. In contrast
to previous work, instead of using the same distribution of the
training data, in our setting, the training set (of the inversion
model) is drawn from a more generic data distribution based
on the background knowledge which is arguably much easier
for the adversary to obtain. For instance, against a facial
recognition classifier, the adversary could randomly crawl
facial images from the Internet to compose an auxiliary set
without knowing the exact training data (distribution). Figure 1
column (c) shows the reconstruction result of the inversion
model trained on auxiliary samples, which clearly outperforms
the result in column (a). We believe that this is because
the auxiliary samples retain generic facial features (e.g., face
edges, eyes and nose) and such information is sufficient to
regularize the originally ill-posed inversion problem. Interest-
ingly, our experiments show that even in cases where the actual
training data is available, augmenting the training data with
generic samples could improve inversion accuracy.
To make the inversion model also work when the adversary
obtains only partial prediction result on victim user’s data, we
propose a truncation method of training the inversion model.
The main idea is to feed the inversion model with truncated
predictions (on the auxiliary samples) during training. Such
truncation forces the inversion model to maximally reconstruct
the samples based on the truncated predictions, and thus align
the inversion model to the truncated values. Furthermore,
truncation helps to reduce overfitting in a similar way of
feature selection [22]. Figure 1 column (b) shows the result
of inverting a partial prediction vector (i.e., keeping the 1/5
largest values while masking the rest to 0) using our truncation
technique.
It turns out that the truncation technique is effective in
our second problem on training class inference. To infer the
training classes, we truncate the classifier’s predictions on
auxiliary samples to one-hot vectors. After the training is
complete, it can produce a representative sample for each
training class by taking one-hot vectors of the classes as input.
Figure 1 column (e) shows the result of our training class
inference. It significantly outperforms MIA (column (f)) and
previous training-based approach (column (g)).
Depending on the adversary’s role, we design two ways of
training the inversion model. First, if the adversary is a user
with no knowledge about the training data and has black-
box access to the classifier (i.e., only prediction results are
available to him), we construct the inversion model by training
a separate model from sketch. Second, if the adversary is the
developer who trains the classifier, the inversion model can be
trained jointly with the classifier on the same training data,
which derives a more precise inversion model. The objective
is to force the classifier’s predictions to also preserve essential
information which helps the inversion model to reconstruct
data. To this end, we use the reconstruction loss of the
inversion model to regularize the training of the classifier.
We evaluate our approaches for various machine learning
tasks and model architectures on multiple image datasets.
The results show that our attack can precisely reconstruct
data from partial predictions without knowing the training
data distribution, and also outperforms previous approaches
in training class inference. This work highlights that the rich
information hidden in the model’s prediction can be extracted,
even if the adversary only has access to limited information.
We hope for this work to contribute to strengthening user’s
awareness of handling derived data.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contri-
butions in this paper.
• We observe that even with partial knowledge of the
training set, it is possible to exploit such background
knowledge to regularize the originally ill-posed inversion
problem.
• We formulate a practical scenario where the adversary
obtains only partial prediction results, and propose a
truncation method that aligns the inversion model to the
space of the truncated predictions.
• Our inversion method can be adopted for training class in-
ference attack. Experimental results show that our method
outperforms existing work on training class inference.
• We observe that even if the classifier’s training set is
available to the adversary, augmenting it with generic
samples could improve inversion accuracy of the inver-
sion model.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Machine Learning
In this paper, we focus on supervised learning, more
specifically, on training classification models (classifiers) using
neural networks [23]. The model is used to give predictions
to input data. The lifecycle of a model typically consists of
training phase (where the model is created) and inference
phase (where the model is released for use).
Machine learning models. A machine learning classifier en-
codes a general hypothesis function Fw (with parameters w)
which is learned from a training dataset with the goal of
making predictions on unseen data. The input of the function
Fw is a data point x ∈ Rd drawn from a data distribution px(x)
in a d-dimensional space X , where each dimension represents
one attribute (feature) of the data point. The output of Fw is
a predicted point Fw(x) in a k-dimensional space Y , where
each dimension corresponds to a predefined class. The learning
objective is to find the relation between each input data and
the class as a function Fw : X 7→ Y . A neural network (deep
learning model) consists of multiple connected layers of basic
non-linear activation functions (neurons) whose connections
are weighted by the model parameter w, with a normalized
exponential function softmax(z)i =
exp(zi)∑
j exp(zj)
added to the
activation signals (referred to as logits) of the last layer. This
function converts arbitrary values into a vector of real values
in [0, 1] that sum up to 1. Thus, the output could be interpreted
as the probability that the input falls into each class.
Training phase. Let x represent the data drawn from the
underlying data distribution px(x), and y be the vectorized
class of x. The training goal is to find a function Fw to well
approximate the mapping between every data point (x,y) in
space X ×Y . To this end, we use a loss function L(Fw(x),y)
to measure the difference between the class y and the classi-
fier’s prediction Fw(x). Formally, the training objective is to
find a function Fw which minimizes the expected loss.
L(Fw) = Ex∼px [L(Fw(x),y)] (1)
The actual probability function px(x) is intractable to
accurately represent, but in practice, we can estimate it using
samples drawn from it. These samples compose the training
set D ⊂ X . We predefine a class y for each data x ∈ D as
supervision in the training process. Hence, we can train the
model to minimize the empirical loss over the training set D.
LD(Fw) =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D
L(Fw(x),y) (2)
Nonetheless, this objective could lead to an overfitted model
which attains a very low prediction error on its training data,
but fails to generalize well for unseen data drawn from px(x).
A regularization term R(Fw) is usually added to the loss
LD(Fw) to prevent Fw from overfitting on the training data.
In summary, the training process of a classifier is to find a
model Fw that minimizes the following objective:
C(Fw) = LD(Fw) + λR(Fw) (3)
where the regularization factor λ controls the balance between
the classification function and the regularization function.
Algorithms used for solving this optimization problem are
variants of the gradient descent algorithm [24]. Stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) [25] is a very efficient method that
updates the parameters by gradually computing the average
gradient on small randomly selected subsets (mini-batches) of
the training data.
Inference phase. In the inference phase (or called testing
phase), the model Fw is used to classify unseen data. Specifi-
cally, function Fw takes any data x drawn from the same data
distribution px(x) as input, and outputs a prediction vector
Fw(x) = (Fw(x)1, ..., Fw(x)k), where Fw(x)i is the proba-
bility of the data x belonging to class i and
∑
i Fw(x)i = 1.
B. Model Inversion
Our approach is related to many previous work on inverting
neural networks from machine learning and computer vision
communities. Inverting a neural network helps in understand-
ing and interpreting the model’s behavior and feature represen-
tations. For example, a typical inversion problem in computer
vision is to reconstruct an image x from its computer vision
features such as HOG [26] and SIFT [27], or from the acti-
vations in each layer of the network including the classifier’s
prediction Fw(x) on it. In general, these inversion approaches
fall into two categories: optimization-based inversion [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and, most similar to our approach,
training-based inversion [15], [16], [17], [18].
Optimization-based inversion. The basic idea of this branch
of work is to apply gradient-based optimization in the input
space X to find an image xˆ whose prediction approximates a
given Fw(x). To this end, the image xˆ should minimize some
loss function between Fw(x) and Fw(xˆ). However, inverting
the prediction of a neural network is actually a difficult ill-
posed problem [17]. The optimization process tends to produce
images that do not really resemble natural images especially
for a large neural network [28]. To mitigate this issue, a series
of studies have investigated using a natural image prior P (xˆ)
to regularize the optimization. The prior defines some statistics
of the image. Formally, the inversion is to find an xˆ which
minimizes the following loss function.
O(xˆ) = L(Fw(xˆ), Fw(x)) + P (xˆ) (4)
where L is some distance metric such as L2 distance. A special
case of such inversion is to generate a representative image
for some class y, by replacing Fw(x) with vectorized y in
this equation [5], [29]. Optimization-based inversion requires
white-box access to the model to compute the gradients.
Various kinds of image priors have been investigated in
the literature. For instances, a common prior is α-norm
Pα(x) = ||x||αα, which encourages the recovered image to
have a small norm. Simonyan et al. [29] use L2 norm while
Mahendran and Vedaldi [11] demonstrate that a relatively
large α produces better result. They choose L6 norm in their
experiments. Mahendran and Vedaldi [11] also investigate
using total variation (TV) PV β (x) for the image prior, which
can encourage images to have piece-wise constant patches. It
is defined in the following.
PV β (x) =
∑
i,j
(
(xi,j+1 − xi,j)2 + (xi+1,j − xi,j)2
)β/2
(5)
Besides, randomly shifting the input image before feeding it
to the network is also used to regularize the optimization in
recent work [30]. In addition, Yosinski et al. [28] investigate
a combination of three other priors. Gaussian blur is used to
penalize high frequency information in the image. They clip
pixels with small norms to preserve only the main object in the
image. Besides, they also clip pixels with small contribution
to the activation. The contribution measures how much the
activation increases or decreases when setting the pixel to 0.
Fredrikson et al. [5] adopt denoising and sharpening filters as
the prior in the model inversion attack (MIA). MIA targets at
generating a representative image for training classes.
However, the simple hand-designed prior P in these ap-
proaches is limited. It cannot really capture the semantic
information in the training data space, so the reconstruction
quality especially against large networks is not satisfactory.
Furthermore, this approach involves optimization at the test
time because it requires computing gradients which makes it
relatively slow (e.g., 6s per image on a GPU [11]).
Training-based inversion. This kind of inversion trains an-
other neural network Gθ (referred to as inversion model in this
paper) to invert the original one Fw. Specifically, given the
same training set of images and their predictions (Fw(x),x),
it learns a second neural network Gθ from sketch to well
approximate the mapping between predictions and images (i.e.,
the inverse mapping of Fw). The inversion model Gθ takes the
prediction Fw(x) as input and outputs an image. Formally, this
kind of inversion is to find a model g which minimizes the
following objective.
C(Gθ) = Ex∼px [R(Gθ(Fw(x)),x)] (6)
where R is the image reconstruction loss such as L2 loss
adopted in work [16]. Dosovitskiy and Brox [17] investigate
using two additional loss items to regularize the training of
the inversion model: loss in feature space and adversarial
loss. Specifically, the loss in feature space encourages the
reconstructed image to preserve perceptually important image
features. The features, for example, can be the activations
in some layer of the inversion model. The adversarial loss
is added to keep the reconstructions realistic. Following the
spirit of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [31], it uses
a discriminator Dφ to discriminate the reconstructed images
from real ones, while the inversion model is trained to “fool”
the discriminator into classifying the reconstructed images as
real. The adversarial loss is defined in the following.
A(Gθ, Dφ) =Ex∼px [log(Dφ(x))]
+ Ex∼px [log(1−Dφ(Gθ(Fw(x))))]
(7)
In contrast to optimization-based inversion, training-based
inversion is only costly during training the inversion model
which is one-time effort. Reconstruction from a given predic-
tion requires just one single forward pass through the network
(e.g., 5ms per image on a GPU [16]).
III. ADVERSARIAL MODEL INVERSION
The adversary could be either the user of a blackbox
classifier Fw, or the developer of Fw. The adversary’s ca-
pabilities and goals differ depending on the role and we
consider three scenarios: (1) A curious user who intends to
reconstruct the victim’s input data from the victim’s truncated
predication vector; (2) A curious user who intends to infer
Fw’s functionality; (3) A malicious developer who intends to
build a Fw, which subsequently could help in reconstructing
the victims’ input from their truncated predication vectors.
A. (Scenario 1) Data reconstruction with blackbox classifier
In this scenario, the adversary is a curious user who has
black-box accesses to a classifier Fw. That is, the adversary
can adaptively feed input to Fw and obtain the output. The
adversary does not know the classifier’s training data (distri-
bution), architecture and parameters. However, the adversary
has some background knowledge on Fw. Specifically, the
adversary know the following:
• Although the adversary does not know the actual training
data that is used to train Fw, the adversary can draw
samples from a more “generic” distribution pa of the
training data. For instance, suppose Fw is a face recog-
nition classifier trained on faces of a few individuals,
although the adversary does not know the faces of those
individuals, the adversary knows that the training data
are facial images and thus can draw many samples from
a large pool of facial images. Intuitively, a distribution
pa is more generic than the original one if pa is the
distribution after some dimension reductions are applied
on the original.
• The adversary knows the input format of Fw, since he
knows the distribution pa. The adversary also knows the
output format of Fw. That is, the adversary know the
dimension of the predication vector. This assumption is
reasonable because even though Fw may return selected
prediction values, the adversary can still estimate the
dimension of the prediction vector. For example, he can
query Fw with a set of input data and collect distinct
classes in the returned predictions as the dimension.
The classifier Fw is also used by many other benign users.
We assume that the adversary has the capability to obtain f , a
m-truncated predication vector of Fw(x) where x is the input
of a victim user, and m is a predefined parameter determined
by the victim. Given a prediction vector g, we say that f is
m-truncated, denoted as truncm(g), when all m largest values
of g remain in f , while the rest are truncated to zeros. For
instance,
trunc2((0.6, 0.05, 0.06, 0.2, 0.09)) = (0.6, 0, 0, 0.2, 0).
Now, given f , black-box access to Fw, and samples from
distribution pa, the adversary wants to find a most probable
data from the distribution pa such that trunc(Fw(x)) = f .
That is, ideally, the adversary wants to find a xˆ that satisfies
the following:
xˆ = arg max
x∈Xf
pa(x)
subject to Xf = {x ∈ X | trunc(Fw(x)) = f}
(8)
Let us call the problem of obtaining xˆ from Fw, f and pa the
data reconstruction problem.
B. (Scenario 2) Training class inference
Same as in scenario 1, in this scenario, the adversary is a
curious user who has black-box accesses to a classifier Fw,
and knows samples from a generic distribution pa.
Instead of data reconstruction, the adversary wants to find
a representative data of the training class. Given black-box
access to a classifier Fw, and a target class y, the adversary
wants to find a data xˆ that satisfies the following.
xˆ = arg max
x∈Xy
pa(x)
subject to Xy = {x ∈ X | Fw(x)y is high}
(9)
where Fw(x)y is the confidence that x is classified by Fw as
class y.
C. (Scenario 3) Joint classifier and model inversion
We also consider the scenario where the adversary is
a malicious developer who trains the classifier Fw and
sells/distributes it to users. Different from the previous two
scenarios, here, the adversary has full knowledge about the
classifier’s training data, architecture and parameters, and
has the freedom to decide what Fw would be. We assume
that after Fw is released, the adversary is able to obtain
truncated predication from the users, and the adversary wants
to reconstruct the users’ input.
Hence, in this scenario, the adversary goal is to train a
classifier Fw that meets the accuracy requirement (w.r.t. the
original classifier’s task), while improving quality of data
reconstruction.
𝐹𝑤 𝐺𝜃𝒙 𝐹𝑤(𝒙)  𝒙
Fig. 2: Framework of training-based inversion approach. The
classifier Fw takes data x as input and produces a prediction
vector Fw(x). The inversion model Gθ outputs the recon-
structed data xˆ with the prediction as input.
D. Applying Prior Work in Adversarial Settings
Let us highlight the difference in the adversary’s capabil-
ities between our adversarial settings and previous inversion
settings.
First, in our adversarial settings, when the adversary is
a user, if he has only black-box accesses to the classifier,
existing optimization-based inversion approaches including
MIA do not work because they require white-box access to
compute the gradients. Besides, many studies have shown
that MIA against large neural networks tends to produce
semantically meaningless images that do not even resemble
natural images [13], [14]. Our experimental result, as shown
in Figure 1 column (f), also reaches the same conclusion.
Second, the adversary as a user has no knowledge about the
classifier’s training data (distribution), which makes previous
training-based approaches impossible to train the inversion
model on the same training data. Third, the adversary, as either
a user or developer, might obtain truncated prediction results.
This makes previous inversion models that are trained on
full predictions ineffective in reconstructing data from partial
predictions, as shown in Figure 1 column (a) and (g).
IV. APPROACH
Our approach adopts previously mentioned training-based
strategy to invert the classifier. The overall framework is shown
in Figure 2. Unlike the optimization-based approaches that
invert a given prediction vector directly from Fw, here, an
inversion model Gθ is first trained, which later takes the
given prediction vector as input and outputs the reconstructed
sample. This is similar to autoencoder [32] where Fw is the
“encoder”, Gθ is the “decoder”, and the prediction is the latent
space.
There are three aspects that are different from autoencoder,
which we will elaborate in this section. (1) When Fw is fixed
(Scenario 1&2), we need training data to train Gθ as we
highlight earlier that the adversary does not have the data that
trains Fw. Section IV-A describes how we obtain the training
set for Gθ. (2) Since our adversary only obtains truncated
prediction, we need a method to “realign” the latent space.
Section IV-B gives the proposed truncation method. (3) In our
Scenario 3, the Fw is not fixed and the adversary can decide
Fw. In this case, this is a joint classifier and inversion model
problem. Section IV-C gives our training method.
A. Gθ’s Training Data: Auxiliary Set
The first important component in the construction of Gθ
is its training set, which is referred to as auxiliary set in the
rest of the paper. The auxiliary set should contain sufficient
semantic information to regularize the ill-posed inversion
problem.
We compose the auxiliary set by drawing samples from a
more generic data distribution pa than the original training
data distribution px. For example, against a facial recognition
classifier of 1,000 individuals, the auxiliary samples could be
composed by collecting public facial images of random indi-
viduals from the Internet. These auxiliary samples still retain
general facial features such as the face edges and locations
of eyes and nose, which are shared semantic features of the
original training data. We believe that such shared features
provide sufficient information to regularize the originally ill-
posed inversion task. To further improve the reconstruction
quality of Gθ, we can specially choose the auxiliary set
to better align the inversion model. For example, against a
facial recognition classifier, we choose the dataset with mostly
frontal faces as the auxiliary set, so as to align the inversion
model to frontal faces.
Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of
sampling auxiliary set from a more generic data distribution,
as shown in Section V-B. The inversion model can precisely
reconstruct the training data points even if it never sees the
training classes during the construction.
B. Truncation Method for Model Inversion
We propose a truncation method of training Gθ to make it
aligned to the partial prediction results. Figure 3 shows the
architecture of the classifier Fw and its inversion model Gθ.
The idea is to truncate the classifier’s predictions on auxiliary
samples to the same dimension of the partial prediction vector
on victim user’s data, and use them as input features to
train the inversion model, such that it is forced to maximally
reconstruct input data from the truncated predictions. Formally,
let a be a sample drawn from pa, and Fw(a) be the classifier’s
prediction. Let m be the dimension of the partial prediction
vectors on victim’s data. We truncate the prediction vector
Fw(a) to m dimensions (i.e., preserving the top m scores but
setting the rest to 0). The inversion model Gθ is trained to
minimize the following objective.
C(Gθ) = Ea∼pa [R(Gθ(truncm(Fw(a))),a)] (10)
where R is the loss function and we use L2 norm as R in
this paper. Note that, it is also possible to add other loss
functions such as adversarial loss in function 7 and TV loss
in function 5 to make the generated data more realistic and
natural. We leave it as future work. The truncation process
can be understood as a similar way of feature selection [22]
by removing unimportant classes in Fw(a) (i.e., those with
small confidence). It helps to reduce overfitting of Gθ such
that it can still reconstruct the input data from the preserved
important classes.
After Gθ is trained, the adversary can feed a truncated
prediction Fw(x) to Gθ and obtain the reconstructed x.
Our inversion model Gθ can be adopted to perform training
class inference (Scenario 2), which is the same adversarial
goal in MIA [5]. Training class inference can be viewed as
setting m = 1, which means the adversary knows only the
class information and targets at generating a representative
sample of each training class. MIA assumes that the adversary
has a white-box access to Fw in the inference phase. Our
method, on the contrary, works with a black-box access to Fw.
Besides, our method can even work in the case that Fw releases
only the largest predicted class with confidence value, because
we can approximate the total number of training classes by
collecting distinct classes from the classifier’s predictions on
our auxiliary set. This greatly reduces the requirement of the
adversary’s capability to infer training classes.
Our experimental results show that the truncation method
of training the inversion model improves the reconstruction
quality from truncated prediction. Previous training-based
approach that directly inputs the partial prediction to the
inversion model produces meaningless reconstruction results
(see more evaluation details in Section V-C).
C. Joint Training of Classifier and Inversion Model
When the adversary is the developer of the classifier, he
could alternatively jointly train the inversion model with the
classifier, which leads to better inversion quality. In particular,
let D be the classifier’s training data. We regularize the
classification loss LD(Fw) (Equation 2) with an additional
reconstruction loss RD(Fw, Gθ). Intuitively, this encourages
the classifier’s predictions to also preserve essential informa-
tion of input data in the latent space, such that the inversion
model can well decode it to recover input data. In this paper,
we use L2 norm as the reconstruction loss RD(Fw, Gθ).
RD(Fw, Gθ) =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D
||(Gθ(truc(Fw(x)))− x||22 (11)
The joint training ensures that Fw gets updated to fit
the classification task, and meanwhile, Gθ is optimized to
reconstruct data from truncated prediction vectors.
It is worth noting that in training Gθ, we find that directly
using prediction vector Fw(x) does not produce optimal
inversion results. This is because the logits z at the output layer
are scaled in [0, 1] (and sum up to 1) to form prediction Fw(x)
by the softmax function (see Section II-A), which actually
weakens the activations of the output layer and thus loses
some information for later decoding. To address this issue,
we rescale the prediction Fw(x) to its corresponding logits
z in the following and use these z to replace the prediction
Fw(x) in our experiments.
z = log(Fw(x)) + c (12)
where c is a constant and is also optimized during training the
inversion model.
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Fig. 3: Architecture of the classifier and inversion model. The classifier Fw takes data x as input and produces a prediction
Fw(x). Such prediction vector is truncated (if necessary) to a new vector trunc(Fw(x)). The inversion model Gθ takes the
truncated prediction as input and outputs a reconstructed data Gθ(trunc(Fw(x))).
TABLE I: Data allocation of the classifier Fw and its inversion
model Gθ.
Classifier Fw Inversion Model Gθ
Task Data Auxiliary Data Distribution
FaceScrub
50% train, 50% test FaceScrub 50% test data Same
80% train, 20% test CelebA Generic
80% train, 20% test CIFAR10 Distinct
MNIST
50% train, 50% test MNIST 50% test data Same
80% train, 20% test (5 labels) MNIST other 5 labels Generic
80% train, 20% test CIFAR10 Distinct
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the inversion performance of
our method and compare it with existing work. We first
introduce the experimental setup. We then evaluate three
factors: the choice of auxiliary set, the truncation method
and the full prediction size. We next evaluate our method
in training class inference attack. Finally, we compare the
inversion performance of the inversion model Gθ trained with
the blackbox classifier Fw and Gθ trained jointly with Fw.
A. Experimental Setup
We perform evaluation on four benchmark image recogni-
tion datasets. For simplicity, all datasets are transformed to
greyscale images with each pixel value in [0, 1]. We detail
each dataset in the following.
• FaceScrub [33]. A dataset of URLs for 100,000 images of
530 individuals. We were only able to download 48,579 im-
ages for 530 individuals because not all URLs are available
during the period of writing. We extract the face of each
image according to the official bounding box information.
Each image is resized to 64× 64.
• CelebA [34]. A dataset with 202,599 images of 10,177
celebrities from the Internet. We remove 296 celebrities
which are included in FaceScrub and eventally we obtain
195,727 images of 9,881 celebrities. This makes sure that
our modified CelebA has no class intersection with Face-
Scrub. This large-scale facial image dataset can represent
the generic data distribution of human faces. To extract
the face of each image, we further crop the official align-
cropped version (size 178×218) by width and height of 108
with upper left coordinate (35, 70). Each image is resized
to 64× 64 and also resized to 32× 32.
• CIFAR10 [35]. A dataset consists of 60,000 images in
10 classes (airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog,
horse, ship and truck). Each image is resized to 64×64 and
also resized to 32× 32.
• MNIST [36]. A dataset composed of 70,000 handwritten
digit images in 10 classes. Each image is resized to 32×32.
We use FaceScrub and MNIST to train the target classifier
Fw. For each Fw that is trained using the dataset D, we
separately train the inversion model Gθ using the same training
set D, training set drawn from a more generic distribution of
D, and training set drawn from distribution that is arguably
semantically different from D. We call these three types of
training data same, generic and distinct respectively. Table I
presents the data allocation for each Fw and its corresponding
Gθ. Note that the auxiliary set of generic data distribution
has no class intersection with the training data of Fw (i.e.,
FaceScrub and MNIST). Specifically, we have cleaned CelebA
by removing the celebrities which are also included in the
FaceScrub dataset. We randomly select 5 classes of MNIST
to train Fw and use the rest 5 classes to form the auxiliary
set. The auxiliary set of distinct data distribution is composed
of samples drawn from an explicitly different data distribution
from the training data.
We use CNN to train Fw, and use transposed CNN to train
Gθ. The FaceScrub classifier includes 4 CNN blocks where
each block consists of a convolutional layer followed by a
batch normalization layer, a max-pooling layer and a ReLU
activation layer. Two fully-connected layers are added after
the CNN blocks, and Softmax function is added to the last
layer to convert arbitrary neural signals into a vector of real
values in [0, 1] that sum up to 1. The FaceScrub inversion
model consists of 5 transposed CNN blocks. The first 4 blocks
each has a transposed convolutional layer succeeded by a
batch normalization layer and a Tanh activation function. The
last block has a transposed convolutional layer followed by
a Sigmoid activation function which converts neural signals
into real values in [0, 1] which is the same range of auxiliary
data. The MNIST classifier and inversion model have similar
architecture as FaceScrub but with 3 CNN blocks in classifier
and 4 transposed CNN blocks in inversion model. More details
of model architectures are presented in Appendix A. The
FaceScrub classifier and MNIST classifier achieve 85.7% and
99.6% accuracy on their test set respectively (80% train, 20%
test), which are comparable to the state-of-the-art classification
performance.
B. Effect of Auxiliary Set
The auxiliary set is an important factor that decides the
inversion quality of Gθ. We evaluate our inversion model Gθ
by training it on different auxiliary sets (i.e., same, generic and
distinct) with the blackbox Fw. We use Gθ to perform data
reconstruction of Fw’s training data and test data (Scenario 1).
Note that in this experiment, we assume that the adversary is
given full prediction values.
We present the inversion results on randomly-chosen train-
ing data and test data of the Fw in Figure 4 and 5. It is
clear to see that the closer the auxiliary set’s data distribution
is to the training data distribution, the better the inversion
quality is. It is worth noting that the auxiliary set of the
generic data distribution has no class intersection with the
classifier’s training data, which means the inversion model
has never seen the training classes during its construction,
but it can still accurately reconstruct the data from these
classes. For example, digit 5,6,7 and 9 in MNIST are not
included in the auxiliary set, yet Gθ can reconstruct these
digits fairly accurately by capturing as many semantic features
of these digits as possible such that they are visually like these
digits. This further demonstrates that the generic background
knowledge could be sufficient in regularizing the ill-posed
inversion. However, if the auxiliary set’s data distribution is
too far from the generic data distribution, the inversion is not
that satisfactory as shown in the 3rd row of Figure 4 and 5.
We believe that it is because the classifier cannot fully extract
the semantic features from these auxiliary samples such that
its predictions on them do not provide sufficient information
for the inversion model to decode.
Summary I: Even with no full knowledge about the
classifier Fw’s training data, accurate inversion is
still possible by training Gθ using auxiliary samples
drawn from a more generic distribution derived from
background knowledge. Such auxiliary set is arguably
easier to obtain.
C. Effect of Truncation
The truncation method of training the inversion model
largely increases the inversion quality in cases where the ad-
versary obtains only partial prediction results on victim user’s
data. Let us denote the dimension of the partial prediction
that the adversary obtains on victim user’s data as m. We
perform the inversion attack (Scenario 1) with m = 10, 50, 100
and 530 against FaceScrub classifier and with m = 3, 5 and
10 against MNIST classifier. We present the inversion results
of our truncation method and previous training-based method
(i.e., without truncation) on FaceScrub classifier in Figure 6
and on MNIST classifier in Figure 7. The auxiliary set is
composed of samples from the generic data distribution for
FaceScrub classifier and from the same data distribution for
MNIST classifier. The presented training data and test data are
randomly chosen.
We can see that our approach outperforms previous ap-
proach especially when the adversary is given partial predic-
tion results. Our approach can produce highly recognizable
images with sufficient semantic information for all m. Previous
approach, although can generate recognizable images when m
is very large, produces meaningless result when m is small.
For our approach, when m is relatively small, it appears that
the inversion result is more a generic face of the target person
with facial details not fully represented. For example, in the
7th column of Figure 6 where the ground truth is a side
face, our inversion result is a frontal face when m = 10
and 50, and becomes a side face when m = 100. This result
demonstrates that truncation indeed helps reduce overfitting
by aligning Gθ to frontal facial images, and with smaller m,
more generalization is observed.
Summary II: Our truncation method of training the
inversion model Gθ makes it still possible to perform
accurate inversion when the adversary is given only
partial prediction results.
D. Effect of Full Prediction Size
Section V-C investigates the effect of m, the size of the
truncated prediction. In this section, we investigate the effect
of the size of the full prediction. Let k be the dimension of
the full prediction. In our experiments, we randomly select k
classes from the FaceScrub and MNIST datasets as the training
data of Fw. We set k = 10, 50, 100 and 530 for FaceScrub and
k = 3, 5 and 10 for MNIST. We present the inversion results
against FaceScrub classifier in Figure 8 and against MNIST
classifier in Figure 9. In all experiments, we assume that the
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Fig. 4: Effect of the auxiliary set on the inversion quality. We use auxiliary set of the same (1st row), generic (2nd row) and
distinct (3rd row) data distributions to train the inversion model. We perform inversion against the FaceScrub classifier Fw on
the Fw’s training data and test data.
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Fig. 5: Effect of the auxiliary set on the inversion quality. We use auxiliary set of the same (1st row), generic (2nd row) and
distinct (3rd row) data distributions to train the inversion model. We perform inversion against the MNIST classifier Fw on
the Fw’s training data and test data.
adversary obtains the full prediction vectors (i.e., m = k).
The auxiliary set is composed of samples from the generic
data distribution for FaceScrub classifier and from the same
data distribution for MNIST classifier. The presented training
data and test data are randomly chosen.
Our experimental results show that the effect of k is similar
with the effect of m that we have discussed. A larger k leads to
a more accurate reconstruction of the target data and a small k
leads to a semantically generic inversion of the corresponding
class. This is because both k and m affect the amount of
predicted information that the adversary can get. The factor
k decides the size of the full prediction vector. The factor m
decides how many predicted classes that the classifier releases
from the k-dimension prediction vector.
E. Training Class Inference
This section evaluates our inversion model Gθ on training
class inference attack (Scenario 2). We compare our method,
MIA and a previous training-based approach (which has no
truncation) against the same Fw trained on FaceScrub. For
our attack, we use CelebA as the auxiliary set. It has no class
intersection with FaceScrub. Hence, the inversion model Gθ
trained on it has never seen the target training classes during
its construction. In particular, we first use the auxiliary set
to approximate the total number of training classes, and we
obtain 530 classes which is actually the true number. During
the training of the inversion model, we encode the classifier’s
prediction result on each auxiliary sample (i.e., the largest
predicted class with confidence) to a 530-dimension vector by
filling rest classes with zeros. We use the encoded predictions
as features to train Gθ. After Gθ is trained, we convert each
training class to a one-hot vector of 530 dimensions and feed
the one-hot vectors to Gθ. The output of Gθ is the inferred
image of the training class.
We present the inference results in Figure 10. We can see
that the inferred images by MIA are semantically meaningless
and do not even form recognizable faces. This is consistent
with conclusions in previous research work [14], [13] where
similar results were obtained. Our results demonstrate again
that MIA is not effective when dealing with complicated
network structures (i.e., CNN in our experiments). Previous
training-based inversion also fail to produce recognizable
facial images. Our method is able to generate highly human-
recognizable faces for each person (class) by capturing se-
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Fig. 6: Effect of truncation for the inversion model Gθ on the
inversion quality. Inversion is performed when the adversary
is given 10, 50, 100 and 530 predicted classes (denoted as
m in each row) from the classifier. Inversion results of our
approach and previous approach are presented in odd and
even columns respectively. We perform the inversion against
FaceScrub classifier and present results on randomly-chosen
training data and test data. The auxiliary set we use is drawn
from generic data distribution.
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Fig. 7: Effect of truncation for the inversion model Gθ on the
inversion quality. Inversion is performed when the adversary
is given 3, 5 and 10 predicted classes (denoted as m in each
row) from the classifier. Inversion results of our approach and
previous approach are presented in odd and even columns re-
spectively. We perform the inversion against MNIST classifier
and present results on randomly-chosen training data and test
data. The auxiliary set we use is drawn from the same data
distribution.
mantic features such as eyes, nose and beard. An interesting
find is that our method consistently produces frontal faces
even though the training facial images of Fw have various
angles, expressions, background and even lightning. This
demonstrates that the inversion model is well aligned to frontal
faces and can capture the semantics of the training person’s
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Fig. 8: Effect of the full prediction size on the inversion
quality. Inversion is performed when the size of the full
prediction vector is 10, 50, 100 and 530 classes (denoted as
k in each row). In each experiment, we assume the adversary
obtains the full prediction vector. We perform the inversion
against FaceScrub classifier and present results on randomly
chosen training data and test data. The auxiliary set we use is
drawn from generic data distribution.
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Fig. 9: Effect of the full prediction size on the inversion
quality. Inversion is performed when the size of the full
prediction vector is 3, 5 and 10 classes (denoted as k in each
row). In each experiment, we assume the adversary obtains
the full prediction vector. We perform the inversion against
MNIST classifier and present results on randomly chosen
training data and test data. The auxiliary set we use is drawn
from the same data distribution.
faces such that it can accurately infer the training classes.
Summary III: Our method outperforms previous meth-
ods in training class inference against complex neu-
ral networks. Our experimental results show that our
method can generate highly recognizable and repre-
sentative sample for training classes.
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Fig. 10: Training class inference results. We present results of
MIA (1st row), previous training-based (TB) inversion (2nd
row) and our inversion (3rd row). Inversion is performed
against FaceScrub classifier. We use auxiliary set of generic
data distribution in our inversion.
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Fig. 11: Inversion results of the inversion model Gθ: trained
with blackbox Fw vs trained jointly with Fw. The target
Fw is FaceScrub. We perform the inversion on the test data.
For training Gθ with the blackbox Fw, we use the same
training data of Fw as the auxiliary set (1st row) and also
use augmented training data with CelebA as the auxiliary set
(3rd row). All the other training details of the two construction
methods are the same.
F. Inversion Model Construction: Trained with Blackbox Fw
vs Trained Jointly with Fw
The inversion model Gθ could be trained with a fixed given
blackbox Fw (as in Scenario 1&2) or trained jointly with Fw
(as in Scenario 3). We evaluate and compare the inversion
quality of Gθ and classification accuracy of Fw between the
two construction methods. To make the construction method
of Gθ as the only factor that affects the inversion performance,
we use the same training data of Fw as the auxiliary set for the
construction with blackbox Fw. All the other training details
(e.g., epochs, batch size, optimizer) of the two construction
methods are the same. We use Gθ to perform test data
reconstruction against the FaceScrub and MNIST classifiers.
In particular, we split a classification dataset to 50% as training
data and the rest 50% as test data.
We present the inversion results of the two construction
methods against FaceScrub and MNIST classifiers in Figure 11
and 12. We can see that constructing Gθ by jointly training
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Fig. 12: Inversion results of the inversion model Gθ: trained
with blackbox Fw vs trained jointly with Fw. The target Fw is
MNIST. We perform the inversion on the test data. For training
Gθ with the blackbox Fw, we use the same training data of
Fw as the auxiliary set. All the other training details of the
two construction methods are the same.
TABLE II: Classification accuracy of the classifier Fw and
average reconstruction loss of the inversion model Gθ. Results
are reported on test set.
Classifier Acc.1 Acc.2 Acc.3 Recon.1 Recon.2 Recon.3
FaceScrub 78.3% 76.8% 78.3% 0.1072 0.0085 0.0083
MNIST 99.4% 99.2% - 0.3120 0.0197 -
1 We train Fw first and then train Gθ with black-box accesses to Fw .
2 We jointly train Fw and Gθ
3 We train Fw first and then train Gθ with black-box accesses to Fw . The
training data is augmented with CelebA.
it with Fw leads to a more accurate reconstruction of the test
data than that trained with the blackbox Fw. To quantify the
reconstruction quality, we present the average reconstruction
loss of Gθ constructed by the two methods in the 5th and 6th
columns of Table II. We can see that the joint training actually
leads to a lower reconstruction loss on the test set. This result
is intuitive, because the joint training can make Fw’s prediction
vectors also preserve essential information about the input data
along with the classification information such that Gθ can well
decode it for reconstruction. However, the better reconstruction
quality is achieved at the cost of lower classification accuracy.
We present the classification accuracy in the 2nd and 3rd
columns of Table II. We can see that the classification accuracy
does drop because of the joint training, but it is still within
an acceptable range (0.2%-1.5%). Note that the classification
accuracy, especially of FaceScrub (78.3%), is a little bit lower
than the accuracy (85.7%) in earlier experiments because here
we use 50% of the original set to train Fw which is less than
previously 80% of the dataset.
Certainly, the adversary (who is the malicious developer in
Scenario 3) can choose to abandon the joint training. That
is, Fw is first trained to achieve high accuracy, and then
the adversary trains the Gθ. Interestingly, the adversary can
choose to use two different training sets, one for Fw and a
different auxiliary set for Gθ. In this experiment, we augment
the original training set with CelebA as the auxiliary set. We
present the result in the 3rd row of Figure 11 and present the
average reconstruction loss on the test set in the last column
in Table II. We can see that by augmenting the training set
with generic data, the inversion model Gθ trained with the
blackbox Fw can achieve comparable reconstruction quality
to Gθ trained jointly with Fw.
Summary IV: Inversion model Gθ trained jointly with
the classifier Fw outperforms Gθ trained with blackbox
Fw in inversion quality but at the cost of acceptable
accuracy loss. Augmenting the auxiliary set with more
generic data can improve Gθ trained with the blackbox
Fw to be comparable to Gθ trained jointly with Fw,
and maintain the accuracy.
VI. RELATED WORK
While deep learning based systems are reported to attain
very high accuracy in various applications [37], [38], there
remains some limitations that hinder wide adoption of these
systems. On the one hand, various studies have demonstrated
that, similar to other data-driven applications, neural networks
pose a threat to privacy [39], [13], [19], [12]. Besides, the
fragility of neural networks is also reported in the presence of
adversarial attacks [40], [41]. On the other hand, an important
drawback of neural networks is their lack of explanation capa-
bility [42]. Thus, motivated either by security or interpretation
reasons, many research efforts have been proposed in the
literature.
A. ML Privacy
Researchers have strongly suggested that ML models suffer
from various privacy threats to its training data [39], [13],
[19], [12], [43]. For instance, given access to an ML model,
an adversary can infer non-trivial and useful information about
its training set [39].
Shokri et al. [13] study membership inference attacks
against ML models, wherein an adversary attempts to learn
if a record of his choice is part of the private training sets.
Fredrikson et al. [5] study a model inversion attack to infer a
representative sample for a target training class. Fredrikson et
al. [19] also propose another attack to infer sensitive attributes
of training data from a released model. Hidano et al. [44]
further propose to infer sensitive attributes in a scenario where
knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes is not necessarily
provided. Wu et al. [45] propose a methodology to formalize
such attribute inference attacks. Giuseppe et al. [46] show that
an adversary could infer the statistical information about the
training dataset in the inference phase of the target model.
Similarly, Hitaj et al. [14] investigate information leakage
from collaborative learning but in the training phase. Melis
et al. [47] investigate membership inference and property
inference against collaborative ML during its training. Wang et
al. [48] study user-level privacy leakage against collaborative
ML also during its training process. Song et al. [49] embed
sensitive information about several training data points into
neural networks in its training phase by exploiting the large
capacity of neural networks or massive unused capacity of
model’s parameter space. This enables the adversary to extract
specific data points in the latter inference phase.
Some of the above mentioned attacks on training data
privacy infer sensitive attributes or statistical information about
the training data. Others can extract training data points
but have to manipulate the training process of the model.
Membership inference attack works in the inference phase
but requires the data is given. Our work, on the other hands,
examines how one can reconstruct either specific training data
points or test data points from their prediction results in the
inference phase.
B. ML in Adversarial Settings
Deep learning techniques, while achieving utmost accuracy
in various application domains [38], [37], were not originally
designed with built-in security. However, recent years have
witnessed an ever increasing adoption of DL models for
security-sensitive tasks, causing the accuracy of the models’
predictions to have significant implications on the security of
the host tasks. Various works have suggested that ML models
are likely vulnerable in adversarial settings [50], [51], [40]. In
particular, an adversary could force a victim model to deviate
from its intended task and behave erratically according to the
adversary’s wish. The adversary can stage these attacks by
corrupting the training phase (e.g., poisoning the training set
with adversarial data augmentation [52], [53], employing ad-
versarial loss function [51]), maliciously modifying the victim
model [40], or feeding the victim model with adversarially
crafted samples [54], [41].
In particular, Szegedy et al. [41] leverage constrained op-
timization algorithm to propose an evasion technique that
confuses the victim model into misclassifying an adversarial
sample which is obtained by introducing a minimal and
visually imperceptible perturbation to a clean sample. Papernot
et al. [55] further show that an adversarial sample that is
crafted to target one victim model can also be effective in
evading another victim model, suggesting a robustness of ad-
versarial samples against different model configurations. While
there exists various attempts to combat against adversarial
samples (e.g., defensive distillation [56] or denoising autoen-
coder [57]), their effectiveness continue to be challenged by
different attacks [40].
On an alternative direction, Liu et al. [53] study a trojaning
attack on neural networks in which an adversary modifies a
pre-trained model into a trojaned model. The trojaned model
has similar performance with the pre-trained model on normal
data, but will behave maliciously when presented with specific
trojan trigger, which is a small stamp that is to be pasted on a
clean sample. A related attack is introduced in BadNets [51],
wherein an adversary poisons the training set with specially
crafted malicious samples so as to “backdoor” the output
model. The backdoored model attains good accuracy on clean
data, but would behave badly when presented with specific
attacker-chosen inputs.
Our focus, on the contrary, is not to deviate ML models from
their intended tasks, but rather to investigate an possibility
of reconstructing input data from the model’s predictions on
them.
C. Secure & Privacy-Preserving ML
In the wake of security and privacy threats posed to ML
techniques, much research has been devoted to provisioning
secure and privacy-preserving training of ML models [58],
[59], [60], [61], [62]. For instances, Abadi et al. study a
framework to train deep learning models that enjoy differential
privacy. Shokri et al. [59] propose a protocol for privacy-
preserving collaborative deep learning, enabling participants
to jointly train a model without revealing their private training
data. Following this work, Phong et al. [63] apply homo-
morphic encryption to further ensure the data privacy against
an honest-but-curious server. Bonawitz et al. [64] present a
solution for secure aggregation of high-dimensional data. In
addition, systems for oblivious multi-party machine learning
has also been built using trusted hardware primitive [60].
The threat models assumed by these techniques are to
protect privacy of users’ data contributed to the training
set. Our work studies a different threat model wherein the
adversary targets at reconstructing user data given the model’s
prediction results on them.
Some research work on protecting the predictions of ML
models has also been proposed recently [61], [62]. For exam-
ples, Dwork and Feldman [61] study a method to make the
model’s predictions achieve differential privacy with respect
to the training data. Our work, on the other hand, studies
the mapping between the prediction vectors and the input
data by training another inversion model. Juvekar et al. [62]
propose Gazelle as a framework for secure neural network
inference in the “machine-learning-as-a-service” setting using
cryptographic tools such that the server cannot obtain the
predictions. However, our work studies a setting where the
user posts their prediction results (e.g., predicted scores of
face beauty and dress sense) to social media which causes an
exposure of the model’s predictions.
D. ML Inversion for Interpretation
Although deep neural networks have demonstrated impres-
sive performance in various applications, it remains not clear
why they perform so well. Much research has been working
on interpreting and understanding neural networks [28], [65],
[29], [66], [67], [68]. Inverting a neural network is one
important method to understand the representations learned
by neural networks.
Simonyan et al [29] visualize a classification model by
generating an image which maximizes the class score, and
computing a class saliency map for a given image and class.
Both methods are based on computing the gradient of the class
score with respect to the input image. Zeiler and Fergus [69]
propose the DeConvNet method to backtrack the network
computations to identify parts of the image responsible for
certain neural activations. They attach a deconvnet to each
of the convnet layers so as to provide a propagation back to
image pixels. Du et al. [70] explain a DNN-based prediction
by a guided feature inversion framework to identify the con-
tribution of each feature in the input as well as to inspect
the information employed by the DNN for the prediction
task. Their experimental results suggest that the higher layers
of DNN do capture the high-level features of the input.
Jacobsen et al. [71] propose an invertible neural network that
preserves information about the input features in each of their
intermediate representations at each layer. They replace the
non-invertible components of the RevNet [72] by invertible
ones. Gillbert et al. [73] focus on a theoretical explanation of
the invertibility of CNN and propose a mathematical model
to recover images from their sparse representations. However,
they make several model assumptions for mathematical anal-
ysis, and there is still a gap between the mathematical model
and the CNN used in practical scenarios. Mash et al. [67]
train generative inversion models to interpret features learned
by neural networks. They make use of autoregressive neural
density models to express a distribution over input features
given an intermediate representation.
The above mentioned research work inverts neural networks
in order to understand and interpret them. Thus, the inversion
can leverage all possible information of the model and the
training data. Our work, on the contrary, inverts a neural
network in the adversarial settings where the adversary’s
capability is limited.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed an effective model inversion approach in the
adversary setting based on training an inversion model that
acts as an inverse of the original model. We observed that
even with no full knowledge about the original training data,
an accurate inversion is still possible by training the inversion
model on auxiliary samples drawn from a more generic data
distribution. We proposed a truncation method of training
the inversion model by using truncated predictions as input
to it. The truncation helps align the inversion model to the
partial predictions that the adversary might obtain on victim
user’s data. Our experimental results show that our approach
can achieve accurate inversion in adversarial settings and
outperform previous approaches.
The seemingly coarse information carried by the prediction
results might lead to causal sharing of such information by
users and developers. Our work, on the other hand, shows
the surprising reconstruction accuracy of the inversion model
when applied in adversarial settings. It is interesting in the
future work to investigate how other loss functions, and other
generative techniques such as Generative Adversarial Network
can be incorporated in the adversarial inversion problem.
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APPENDIX
A. Model Architecture
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Sequential( 
    (0): Conv2d(1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (3): ReLU(inplace) 
    (4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (6): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (7): ReLU(inplace) 
    (8): Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (10): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (11): ReLU(inplace) 
    (12): Conv2d(512, 1024, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (14): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (15): ReLU(inplace) 
    (16): Linear(in_features=16384, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
    (17): Dropout(p=0.5) 
    (18): Linear(in_features=2650, out_features=530, bias=True) 
) 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): ConvTranspose2d(530, 1024, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): Tanh() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(1024, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (11): Tanh() 
    (12): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): Sigmoid() 
) 
 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): Conv2d(1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (3): ReLU(inplace) 
    (4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (6): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (7): ReLU(inplace) 
    (8): Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (10): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (11): ReLU(inplace) 
    (12): Linear(in_features=8192, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
    (13): Dropout(p=0.5) 
    (14): Linear(in_features=2650, out_features=530, bias=True) 
) 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): ConvTranspose2d(530, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): Tanh() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): Sigmoid() 
) 
Fig. 13: FaceSc ub classifier architecture.
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Sequential( 
0 1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)  
1 128 ntum=0.1, affine=True, track_ru ning_stats=True) 
2): MaxPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, 
3): ReLU(inplace) 
4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)  
5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, mo entum=0.1, affine=True, track_run ing_stats=True) 
6): MaxPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, 
7): ReLU(inplace) 
8): Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
0 MaxPool2d(k rnel_ ize=2 strid =2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
   (11): ReLU(inplace) 
   (12): Conv2d(512, 1024, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
14): MaxPool2d(k rnel_size= , strid =2, p dding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
5): ReLU(inplace) 
16): Linear(in_features=16384, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
17): Dropout( =0.5) 
18): Linear(in_featur s=2650, out_f atures=530, bias=True) 
)
 
Sequential( 
    (0): ConvTranspose2d(530, 1024, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): Tanh() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(1024, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (11): Tanh() 
    (12): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): Sigmoid() 
) 
 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): Conv2d(1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (3): ReLU(inplace) 
    (4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (6): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (7): ReLU(inplace) 
    (8): Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (10): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (11): ReLU(inplace) 
    (12): Linear(in_features=8192, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
    (13): Dropout(p=0.5) 
    (14): Linear(in_features=2650, out_features=530, bias=True) 
) 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): ConvTranspose2d(530, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): Tanh() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchN rm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): Sigmoid() 
) 
Fig. 14: FaceScrub inversion model architecture.
11/14/20 8 net
file:///home/yziqi/Desktop/net 1/2
Sequential( 
0 Conv2d(1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
BatchNorm2d(128 eps=1e-05, mom n m=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
2 M xPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
3): ReLU(inplace) 
4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
6): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
7 ReLU(inplace) 
8 Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
9 B tchNorm2d(512, ps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    ( 0 MaxP ol2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    ( 1 ReLU(inplac ) 
    (12): Conv2d(512, 1024, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
   (13): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (14): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
15): ReLU(i plac ) 
6): Linear(in_features=16384, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
17): Dropout(p=0.5) 
18): Linear(in_f atures=2650, out_features=530, bias=True) 
)
Sequential( 
0 ConvTranspose2d(530, 024, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
1 B tchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
2 Ta h() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(1024, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): BatchNorm2d(128, ps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (11): Tanh() 
    (12): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): Sigmoid() 
) 
 
 
Sequential( 
   (0): Conv2d(1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
2 MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, st ide=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
3 ReLU(inplace) 
4 Co v2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
5 BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum 0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
6 M xPool2d(kernel_size=2, strid =2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
7 ReLU inplace) 
8 2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
9 512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, a fine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
10): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
11): ReLU(i place) 
2 L near(in_features=8192, out_features=50, bias=True) 
   (13): Dropout(p=0.5) 
    (14): Linear(in_features=50, out_features=10, bias=True) 
) 
 
Sequential( 
    (0): ConvTranspose2d(10, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
    (1): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (2): Tanh() 
    (3): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): Sigmoid() 
) 
Fig. 15: MNIST classifier architecture.
11/14/20 8 net
file:///home/yziqi/Desktop/net 1/2
Sequential( 
    (0): 1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    ( ): a 128
2): MaxPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, pad ing=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
3): ReLU(inplace) 
4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
5): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, mo entum=0.1, affine=True, track_runni g_sta s=True) 
6): MaxPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, pad ing=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
7 ReLU(inplace) 
8 Conv2d(256, 51 , k rnel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    ( 0 MaxPool2d(kernel_ ize=2 strid =2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    (11): ReLU(inplace) 
    (12): Conv2d(512, 1024, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (13): BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (14): MaxPool2d(k rnel_size= , strid =2, padding=0 dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
    ( 5): ReLU(inplace) 
    (16): Linear(in_features=16384, out_features=2650, bias=True) 
17): Dropout( =0.5) 
18): Linear(in_featur s=2650, out_f a res=530, b as )
)
Sequential( 
0 Co vTranspose2d(530, 1024, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
1 BatchNorm2d(1024, eps=1e-05, momentum 0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
2): Tanh() 
3): ConvTranspose2d(1024, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
4): BatchNorm2d(51 , eps=1e-05, momentum 0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
5): Tanh() 
6): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kern l_size (4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
7): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
8): Tanh() 
   (9): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
10): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
1): Tan () 
12): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1 k 2 2), padding (1, 1 ) 
3): Sigmoid() 
)
Sequential( 
0 1, 128, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
1 (128
2 M xPo l2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, pad ing=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
3 ReLU(inplace) 
    (4): Conv2d(128, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), tride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
 5): BatchNorm2d(2 6, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
6): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, s ride=2, padding=0, dilation=1, ceil_mode=False) 
   (7): ReLU(inplace) 
   (8): Conv2d(256, 512, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (9): BatchNorm2d(512, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
10): MaxPool2d(k rnel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, d lat on= , ceil_mode=False) 
1): ReLU(inplace) 
12): Linear(in_features=8192, out_features=50, bias=True) 
13): Dropout( =0.5) 
14): Linear(in_featur s=50, out_features 10, bias=True) 
)
Sequential( 
0 Co vTranspose2d(10, 512, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(1, 1)) 
1 BatchNorm2d(512, eps= e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True track_run ing_stats=True) 
2): Tanh() 
   (3): ConvTranspose2d(512, 256, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (4): BatchNorm2d(256, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (5): Tanh() 
    (6): ConvTranspose2d(256, 128, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (7): BatchNorm2d(128, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1, affine=True, track_running_stats=True) 
    (8): Tanh() 
    (9): ConvTranspose2d(128, 1, kernel_size=(4, 4), stride=(2, 2), padding=(1, 1)) 
    (10): Sigmoid() 
) 
Fig. 16: MNIST inversion model architecture.
